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Introduction
EXPLORING GENETICS AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE1
This special issue was motivated by what appeared to be a strange par-
adox. Just about every week the Science Times—one of the places where
science meets the public—enthusiastically reported on new research find-
ings that revealed the genetic basis for something (intelligence, voting
behavior, obesity, depression, sexual behavior, religiosity, orgasms, altru-
ism and egoism, generosity, thrift, and, of course, earwax type). Aside
from the earwax, the phenomena reported to be “genetic” were largely of
sociological interest. Yet sociologists were rarely discussed in these articles.
Meanwhile, the prevailing sentiment of the discipline appeared to be that
the emphasis on genetic expression as explanation for human behavior
and social outcomes was at best undermining sociological perspectives
and at worst a return of the eugenicist project of the first half of the 20th
century. The two reactions—enthusiastic embrace and uncritical adoption
(as represented in the Science Times) and fear and loathing (from soci-
ologists)—appeared to be in some tension. However, thinking about it a
little more, one realizes that they arise from the same source: a naive
overvaluation of “genetics.”
It is old hat now to point out that the observation of genetic expression
on some behavior has to be “good” for sociology since it provides soci-
ologists with a reason to focus on social structure. One could of course
respond that we do not need new reasons, and the reasons we have work
well enough. But if we join the community baseball team for exercise
and discover, after a while, that we also benefit from attachment to the
community, we need not reject either exercise or attachment as motivation.
Likewise, we may not need a new motivation, but there is nothing gained
by rejecting new reasons for doing something. The obvious fact is that
genetic expression can only reveal itself through social structural change.
1 Partial funding for this issue was generously supplied by the Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation Health and Society Scholars Program at Columbia University. Although
the conventions of double-blind review prevent us from identifying by name the persons
who read and commented on the submissions that we received, we are deeply in their
debt for their collaboration on this special issue. Correspondence may be directed to
the AJS editorial office (ajs@press.uchicago.edu) or to Peter Bearman, ISERP,
814 SIPA Building, Columbia University, New York, New York 10027. E-mail:
psb17@columbia.edu
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The example that seems to resonate with the public is the fact that genetic
expression for obesity can only be observed in societies that can produce
food surpluses (a relatively modern phenomenon). One could find many
other similar examples.
Our colleagues in the life sciences—system biologists, for example—
now routinely begin their work with the observation of genetic expression
and then focus on modeling the dynamic system(s) through which genes
come to matter. That this is a sociological project is evident not least
because many of the most complex elements to make sense of are social,
not biological. In this respect, the observation of genetic expression at a
particular time or in a particular context invites sociologists to study social
structure, and specifically to study social structure in comparative and
historical perspective. In the most positive vein, the current interest in
genetics may provide a new lever for sociologists to escape what appears
at times to be a hegemonic focus on just “our” society.
Three issues, at the least, appear to concern sociologists about genetics.
The first concern that sociologists have about the observation of genetic
expression is that if such expression is observed, it serves to legitimate
existing arrangements, because, after all, they are “genetic.” For the same
reasons that sociologists rejected functionalism, and with the same ease,
it is possible to reject arguments of this kind. There are lots of bad ideas
in the world, and this is an example of one of them. The second concern
is that borrowing methods and data from disciplines engaged in research
on the genetics of human behavior necessarily legitimizes those disciplines
and runs the risk of distorting the sociological project. Ignoring the fact
that the beauty of sociology as a discipline rests in its hybridty with respect
to method and data, we can see that the articles assembled here suggest
that this concern is unfounded. It is possible, for example, to arrive at
sociological insight even from the application of behavioral genetics meth-
ods. The third concern that sociologists have, as indicated above, is that
the focus on the supposed genetics of behavior is a eugenicist project in
(not so veiled) disguise. This appears akin to the idea that the study of
social movements is a revolutionary project in disguise. One needs only
to read the literature to be disabused of the notion.
In any case, the genetics of behavior and outcomes is not the focus of
this special issue. The articles collected in this issue may, as a by-product,
consider and describe such expression, but their central aim is different.
The goal of the issue is to open up new avenues for answers to the question,
What can we learn about social structure and social processes, and what
can we learn about our accounts about social structure and process, by
“thinking about genetics”? The metaphor of the archive, though not per-
fect, may be useful. Social scientists now have a new archive to dig around
in. That archive consists of all the research studies that map “genetics”
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onto behavior, onto health, and onto social outcomes, and it consists of
raw data for us, and others, to work with. This issue considers, early on
after the opening of this archive, whether or not there is anything that
sociologists can learn from working with, and thinking with, genetics. In
short, the articles here are designed to answer the question, Are genes
good to think with?
No one is expecting that a single foray into a new archive will change
all of our current understandings, and many may conclude that the core
sociological problems of what has indeed been a long century of sociol-
ogy—social inequality, alienation and anomie, the problem of order, rei-
fication, ethnic and religious conflict, and discontent, just to select a few—
remain untouched by the new insights that our poking around in this new
archive will reveal. But we will never know if we do not look. It was in
this spirit that we asked those who contributed to the issue to consider
whether or not, by entering into this archive, we see something differently,
see something different, or find at our disposal different ways to reveal
aspects of social life that we have seen for a long time.2
The idea that thinking about genetics might serve as a useful lever for
revealing elements of social structure not previously seen arose in a series
of conversations organized in 2006 by the Robert Wood Johnson Health
and Society Scholars Program at Columbia University. With funding from
that program, Sara Shostak and Molly Martin (the associate editors of
this issue) coordinated a small conference in which this theme was spe-
cifically addressed. At this conference, the idea of a special issue arose.
With the support of the AJS editorial board, we issued an open call for
papers. Our expectation was that we would receive a handful of papers,
mostly those written by participants in the conference.
As with many expectations, this one was off the mark. We received far
more submissions and, for lack of a better term, partial submissions, than
we had expected. Many came from sociologists. Many came from scholars
working in cognate fields. We rejected dozens of papers that were of great
interest, asked for revisions of papers that gave reviewers pause, and
suggested others for review at AJS in the general stream of work, outside
the special issue. Throughout, our idea for the special issue was to achieve
two goals simultaneously. The first was to publish the best work that
came our way. The second was to publish papers representative of the
2 The archive imagery here refers more to those places that historians crawl around
in than to the archive as the system of forming and transforming statements existing
at a given period within a particular society (a` la Foucault). Those who overvalue
genetics certainly fear that this archive will become the latter. Of course, this is exactly
why it is important that sociologists take advantage of the fact that thinking with
genetics speaks of genetics per se only as a by-product of producing knowledge about
social contexts broadly construed.
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breadth of work being undertaken in the discipline, as revealed by the
submissions we received. We did not have clear ideas about what kinds
of papers would find their way to us for review, but it seemed critical
that the special issue should be a “big tent” in which all of the various
modalities in which relevant work was undertaken would have a shot at
publication.
As it turned out, the submissions that successfully worked their way
through peer review broadly fell into three groupings, and this issue re-
flects those groupings. In the first group are articles that use data about
specific polymorphisms. These articles concern very different outcomes,
with one focused on alcoholism (Pescosolido et al.) and the other on ed-
ucational outcomes (Shanahan et al.). In the second group are articles
that concern heritability. In this issue three “heritability” articles are in-
cluded, focusing on food (Martin), sex (Guo et al.), and happiness (Schnitt-
ker). Though the articles were not selected on this basis, the list covers
some of the essential aspects of the human experience; we regret that no
papers on rock and roll were submitted for review. The third set of articles
more explicitly considers whether “genes” are things to think with and in
what ways they are useful to think with. In this group there are four
articles, which, serendipitously, form a ladder from the micro- to the
macrolevel, moving from the individual (Freese) to the institutional
(Morning), mesoinstitutional (Shostak et al.), and macrolevel (Penner). In
short, the articles run the gamut with respect to diversity of modes of
inquiry and sites for engagement. We hope that they are read (and eval-
uated) in terms of their ability to reveal a world that, because of their
analysis, we can see now but could not necessarily see, or see as clearly,
before.
Very briefly, I will discuss the main contributions of each article as a
road map for the reader who would like to select only a few articles to
study in depth. The articles appear in alphabetical order by author’s last
name—there is no significance other than chance to their order—but
strangely the first article is authored by an F. Freese’s article, “Genetics
and the Social Science Explanation of Individual Outcomes,” argues that
genetics can only influence major outcomes by first influencing the de-
velopment of our embodied characteristics, especially psychological traits;
that the challenges posed to sociology by behavioral genetics therefore
are challenges primarily from psychology; and that because the impor-
tance of genetic differences depends on social context, sociologists need
to develop theory about the aspects of social context that lead genetic
differences to matter. Guo, Tong, and Cai, in “Gene by Social Context
Interactions for Number of Sexual Partners among White Male Youths:
Genetics-Informed Sociology,” illustrate how introducing molecular ge-
netic measures into sociological analyses yields new insight into our un-
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derstanding of social context. Drawing on the white male DNA sample
from Add Health, Guo et al. show that, in school cultures shaped by early
initiation into sex, the protective factor of the 9R/9R genotype relative to
the Any10R genotype in the dopamine transporter gene DAT1 is lost.
Martin’s article, “The Intergenerational Correlation in Weight: How
Genetic Resemblance Reveals the Social Role of Families,” uses the lens
of thinking about genetics to show how characteristics of families, and
what families do, shape adolescents’ weight whether or not they are pre-
disposed to be thin or obese. In “Reconstructing Race in Science and
Society: Biology Textbooks, 1952–2002,” Morning shows how, after de-
cades of the declining significance of race (in textbooks), race is now taught
in high school science curricula, though with emphasis on genetic rather
than phenotypical definitions, and with quite different empirical supports.
By thinking about how genetics is deployed in science, Morning offers
new insights about the complexity of race in America. Penner’s article,
“Gender Differences in Extreme Mathematical Achievement: An Inter-
national Perspective on Biological and Social Factors,” reports that gender
differences in math achievement vary widely from country to country,
suggesting that social factors play an important role in creating gender
differences in mathematics achievement. In “Under the Influence of Ge-
netics: How Transdisciplinarity Leads Us to Rethink Social Pathways to
Illness,” Pescosolido et al. show that, while there is strong evidence for
risk of alcohol dependence associated with the GABRA2 gene, residing
in a context with strong social support virtually washes away the enhanced
risk arising from genetic endowment, thus drawing our attention to the
importance of social isolation in the observation of genetic expression for
alcoholism.
Rodgers et al., in “Education and Cognitive Ability as Direct, Medi-
ating, or Spurious Influences on Female Age at First Birth: Behavior
Genetic Models Fit to Danish Twin Data,” use a behavioral genetic anal-
ysis framework to demonstrate that family environment processes that
lead families to be different from one another, instead of creating differ-
ences among siblings within the same family, are critically important for
influencing parental age at first birth. Moving from sex to happiness,
Schnittker’s article, “Happiness and Success: Genes, Families and the
Psychological Effects of Socioeconomic Position and Social Support,”
shows how, on one hand, the environmental factors related to happiness
are influenced by genes. For example, satisfying friendships and a good
job are heritable, even though we ordinarily think of these things as purely
social. On the other hand, he shows that the genetic influences behind
these factors do little to undermine the relationship between the environ-
ment and happiness. It follows that individuals are capable of creating
their own happiness even as genetic influences are pervasive. In “Envi-
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ronmental Contingencies and Genetic Propensities: Social Capital, Edu-
cational Continuation, and Dopamine Receptor Gene DRD2,” Shanahan
et al. illustrate how behaviors are influenced by both genetics and the
environment, where the environment is a complex of interacting social
factors. In this case, continuation of schooling is influenced by DRD2,
but the negative effects of DRD2 are washed out under specific environ-
mental contexts. By thinking with genes, Shanahan et al. identify new
elements of the environment that sociologists should study. Finally, Shos-
tak, Conrad, and Horwitz, in “Sequencing and Its Consequences: Path
Dependence and the Relationships between Genetics and Medicalization,”
consider when genetic knowledge leads to the medicalization of outcomes.
For outcomes for which a gene marker has been identified, Shostak et al.
are able to reveal the institutional nexus and path dependent pathways
by which findings from genetic research are mobilized into public dis-
course and public understanding of homosexuality, depression, and neg-
ative health outcomes arising from environmental exposures, thereby con-
tributing to our understanding of the dynamics of medicalization.3
The articles in this issue are little more than a start to an intellectual
program whose end is unclear. If all that happens when sociologists look
at genetics is that they report genetic effects on behaviors and outcomes
that are of sociological interest, less will be gained than seems possible.
Alternatively, future work can follow the path that the authors of these
articles have begun to lay down by using genetics—and entering into the
new archive—to learn something deeper about the social structures we
live in and the mechanisms that give rise to those structures. Like a lot
of other projects, this one is distinctly sociological.
Peter Bearman
Columbia University
3 While the two associate editors (Martin and Shostak) have articles in this issue, those
submissions, like all others, were subject to double-blind review. While the issue in
general would not have been possible without their editorial contributions, they were
not consulted in the assessment of their own articles, and, in the final analysis, the
composition of the issue was made independent of their input.
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